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Broad Outline
• Real-life Motivational Examples (Why?)
• Trust : Characteristics and Related Concepts (What?)
• Trust Ontology (What?)
– Type, Value, Process, Scope
• Gleaning Trustworthiness (How?) + Robustness to Attack
– Practical Examples of Trust Metrics
– Comparative Analysis of Bayesian Approaches to Trust
• Research Challenges (Why-What-How?)
– Sensor Networks
– Social Networks
– Interpersonal

• Details of Bayesian Approach to Multi-level Trust
May 21, 2012
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Real-life Motivational Examples
(Why track trust?)

May 21, 2012
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Interpersonal
• With which neighbor should we leave our
children over the weekend when we are
required to be at the hospital?
• Who should be named as a guardian for our
children in the Will?

May 21, 2012
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Social
• In Email:
– SUBJECT: [TitanPad] Amit Sheth invited you to an
EtherPad document.
– CONTENT: View it here:
http://knoesis.titanpad.com/200

• Issue: Is the request genuine or a trap?

May 21, 2012
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Social
• To click or not to click a http://bit.ly-URL

• To rely or not to rely on a product review
(when only a few reviews are present, or the
reviews are conflicting)?

May 21, 2012

Trust Networks: T. K. Prasad

6

Sensors
• Weather sensor network predicts a potential tornado in
the vicinity of a city.
• Issue: Should we mobilize emergency response teams
ahead of time?
• Van’s TCS (Traction Control System) indicator light came
on intermittently, while driving.
• Issue: Which is faulty: the indicator light or the traction
control system?
• Van’s Check Engine light came on, while driving.
• Issue: Which is faulty: the indicator light or the
transmission?
May 21, 2012
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Man-Machine Hybrid
Collaborative Systems
The 2002 Uberlingen Mid-air Collision (between
Bashkirian Airlines Flight 2937 and DHL Flight
611) occurred because the pilot of one of the
planes trusted the human air traffic controller
(who was ill-informed about the unfolding
situation), instead of the electronic TCAS system
(which was providing conflicting but correct
course of action to avoid collision).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_Uberlingen_mid-air_collision
May 21, 2012
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Man-Machine Hybrid
Collaborative Systems
In hybrid situations, artificial agents
should
reason
about
the
trustworthiness and deceptive
actions of their human counter
parts. People and agents in virtual
communities will deceive, and will
be deceived.
Castelfranchi and Tan, 2002
May 21, 2012
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Common Issues and Context
• Uncertainty
– About the validity of a claim or
assumption
– Past Experience : Vulnerability
• Need for action
• Critical decision with potential for loss
May 21, 2012
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Commonality among Trust Definitions*
• a Trustor
– someone who must choose whether, and how much, to
trust

• a Trustee
– someone or something that is to be trusted

• an Action
– by which the trustor is choosing to be vulnerable to the
trustee based on an assessment of trustee’s nature

• a Context
– in which the potential negative consequences of betrayal
outweigh any perceived positive results.
*http://www.iarpa.gov/rfi_trust.html
May 21, 2012
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Sources of uncertainty
• In social network, trustor’s incomplete
knowledge or trustee’s devious intentions.
• In sensor network, unpredictable environment
(e.g., random phenomenon), or sensor faults
(e.g., due to aging), leading to corrupt data.
• In cognitive radio networks, unpredictable
channel noise or traffic.
• Interpersonal examples
– Irresponsible / selfish / greedy / vengeful traits
May 21, 2012
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Why Track Trust?
• In Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs),
trust enables dynamic determination of
secure routes.
– Efficiency: To improve throughput
• By avoiding nodes facing bad channel condition

– Robustness : To detect malicious nodes
• When attackers enter the network in spite of
secure key distribution/authentication
May 21, 2012
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Why Track Trust?
• In sensor networks, it allows detection of
faults and transient bad behaviors due to
environmental effects.

• In cognitive radio networks, it can enable
selection of optimal channel (less noisy,
less crowded channels).
May 21, 2012
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Why Track Trust?
• In E-commerce:

–To predict future behavior in a
reliable manner.
–To incentivize “good” behavior and
discourage “bad” behavior.
–To detect malicious entities.
May 21, 2012

Trust Networks: T. K. Prasad

15

The Two Sides of Trust
• Trustor
assesses
trustee
for
dependability.
• Trustee casts itself in positive light to
trustor.
• Trust is a function of trustee's
perceived trustworthiness and the
trustor's propensity to trust.
May 21, 2012
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Risk/uncertainty mitigation
• Compensating factors that alter trust
threshold
• In e-commerce, warranties and insurance
reduce risk.
• In sensor networks, redundancy enables
filtering of corrupt data.
• In interpersonal situations, close ties
help.
May 21, 2012
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Trust and Related Concepts
(What is trust?)

May 21, 2012

Trust Networks: T. K. Prasad

18

Trust Definition : Psychology slant
Trust is the psychological state
comprising a willingness to be
vulnerable in expectation of a
valued result.
Ontology of Trust, Huang and Fox, 2006
Josang et al’s Decision Trust
May 21, 2012
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Trust Definition : Psychology slant
Trust in a person is a commitment to
an action based on a belief that the
future actions of that person will
lead to good outcome.
Golbeck and Hendler, 2006
May 21, 2012
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Trust Definition : Probability slant

Trust (or, symmetrically, distrust)
is a level of subjective probability
with which an agent assesses
that another agent will perform
a particular action, both before
and independently of such an
action being monitored …
Can we Trust Trust?, Diego Gambetta, 2000
Josang et al’s Reliability Trust
May 21, 2012
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Trustworthiness Definition :
Psychology Slant
Trustworthiness is a collection of
qualities of an agent that leads them
to be considered as deserving of
trust from others (in one or more
environments,
under
different
conditions, and to different degrees).
http://www.iarpa.gov/rfi_trust.html
May 21, 2012
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Trustworthiness Definition :
Probability slant

Trustworthiness is the objective
probability that the trustee
performs a particular action on
which the interests of the
trustor depend.
Solhaug et al, 2007
May 21, 2012
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Trust vs Trustworthiness : My View
Trust Disposition
Depends on
Potentially Quantified Trustworthiness Qualities
+
Context-based Trust Threshold
E.g.*, In the context of trusting strangers, people in

the West will trust for lower levels of trustworthiness
*Bohnet et al, 5/2010
than people in the Gulf.
May 21, 2012
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Qualitative Trust Dispositions
(depends on Trust Threshold)

http://paulenglish.com/trust.html
May 21, 2012
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(Community-based) Reputation
• Reputation* is the community or public
estimation of standing for merit,
achievement, reliability, etc. *dictionary.com
• Reputation** is the opinion (or a social
evaluation) of a community toward a
person, a group of people, or an
organization on a certain criterion. **Wikipedia
• Cf. Brand-value, PageRank, eBay profile, etc.
May 21, 2012
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Trust vs. (Community-based)
Reputation
Reputation can be a basis for trust.
However, they are different notions*.
• I trust you because of your good reputation.
• I trust you despite your bad reputation.
• Do you still trust Toyota brand?
*Josang et al, 2007
May 21, 2012
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Trust vs. (Community-based)
Reputation
Trust :: Reputation
::::
Local :: Global
::::
Subjective :: Objective
(Cf. Security refers to resistance to attacks.)
May 21, 2012
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Reputation is Overloaded
Community-based Reputation
vs.
Temporal Reputation
(Cf. Sustained good behavior over time elicits
temporal reputation-based trust.)
May 21, 2012
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Trust is well-known,
but is not well-understood.
The utility of a notion
testifies not to its clarity but
rather to the philosophical
importance of clarifying it.
-- Nelson Goodman
(Fact, Fiction and Forecast, 1955)
May 21, 2012
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Trust Ontology
(What is trust?)
Illustration of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning:
Relating Semantics to Data Structures and Algorithms

May 21, 2012

Trust Networks: T. K. Prasad

35

Example Trust Network Different Trust Links with Local Order on out-links

• Alice trusts Bob for recommending good
mechanic.
• Bob trusts Dick to be a good car mechanic.
• Charlie does not trust Dick to be a good
mechanic.
• Alice trusts Bob more than Charlie,
recommending good car mechanic.
• Alice trusts Charlie more than Bob,
recommending good baby sitter.

car

car

for
for

*Thirunarayan et al, IICAI 2009
May 21, 2012
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Digression: Illustration of Knowledge
Representation and Reasoning
• Abstract and encode clearly delineated “subarea”
of knowledge in a formal language.
– Trust Networks => node-labeled, edge-labeled
directed graph (DATA STRUCTURES)

• Specify the meaning in terms of how “network
elements” relate to or compose with each other.
– Semantics of Trust, Trust Metrics => using logic or
probabilistic basis, constraints, etc. (SEMANTICS)

• Develop efficient graph-based procedures
– Trust value determination/querying (INFERENCE
ALGORITHMS)
May 21, 2012
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(In recommendations)
(For capacity to act)
(For lack of
capacity to act)
May 21, 2012
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Trust Ontology*
6-tuple representing a trust relationship:
{type, value, scope, process}
trustor

trustee

Type

–

Represents the nature of trust relationship.

Value

–

Quantifies trustworthiness for comparison.

Scope

–

Represents applicable context for trust.

Process –

Represents the method by which the value is
created and maintained.
*Anantharam et al, NAECON 2010

May 21, 2012
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Trust Ontology:
Trust Type, Trust Value, and Trust Scope
 Trust Type*
 Referral Trust – Agent a1 trusts agent a2’s ability to
recommend another agent.
 (Non-)Functional Trust – Agent a1 (dis)trusts agent a2’s
ability to perform an action.
 Cf. ** trust in belief vs. trust in performance

 Trust Value
 E.g., Star rating, numeric rating, or partial ordering.
 Trust Scope*
 E.g., Car Mechanic context.
*Thirunarayan et al, IICAI 2009
** Huang and Fox, 2006
May 21, 2012
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Multidimensional / Orthogonal
Trust Scopes in Ecommerce
• Trust in a vendor to deliver on
commitments
• Trust in vendor's ethical use of
consumer data
• Trust in Internet communication being
secure.
• Plus: Propensity/Disposition to trust
May 21, 2012
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Trust Ontology:
Trust Process

 Represents the method by which the value
is computed and maintained.
 Primitive (for functional and referral links)*
 Reputation – based on past behavior (temporal) or
community opinion.
 Policy – based on explicitly stated constraints.
 Evidence – based on seeking/verifying evidence.
 Provenance – based on lineage information.

 Composite (for admissible paths)**
 Propagation (Chaining and Aggregation)
*Anantharam et al, NAECON 2010
**Thirunarayan et al, IICAI 2009
May 21, 2012
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Trust Ontology

May 21, 2012

Trust Networks: T. K. Prasad

46

Example Trust Network illustrating Ontology Concepts
Dick is a
certified
mechanic

Bob is a car
aficionado
type: referral
process: reputation
scope: car mechanic
value: TAB

Bob

TAB > TAC

Alice

type: referral
process: reputation
scope: car mechanic
value: TAC

type: functional
process: policy
scope: car mechanic
value: 10

type: non-functional
process: reputation
scope: car mechanic
value: 3

Charlie

ASE certified

Dick

47

Unified Illustration of Trust Processes
Scenario : Hiring Web Search Engineer - An R&D Position
Various Trust Processes :

• (Temporal-based) Reputation: Past job experiences
• (Community-based) Reputation: Multiple
references
• Policy-based: Score cutoffs on screening test
• Provenance-based: Department/University of
graduation
• Evidence-based: Multiple interviews (phone, onsite, R&D team)
May 21, 2012
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Deception
• Deception is the betrayal of trust.
–Ironically, trust makes us prone to
deception.
–Knowing what features are used to
glean trustworthiness can also assist
in avoiding detection while deceiving.
May 21, 2012
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Gleaning Trustworthiness :
Practical Examples
(How to determine trustworthiness?)

May 21, 2012
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Trust Metric and Trust Model
• Trust Metric => How is primitive trust
represented?
• E.g., Real number, Finite levels, Partial Order, Opinion =
(belief, disbelief, uncertainty), etc.

• Trust Model => How is composite trust
computed or propagated?
Y. L. Sun, et al, 2/2008
May 21, 2012
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Ideal Approach
• Capture semantics of trust using
– axioms for trust propagation, or
– catalog of example trust networks that are
equivalent.

• Develop trust computation rules for
propagation
(that
is,
chaining
and
aggregation) that satisfy the axioms or
equivalence relation.
May 21, 2012
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Direct Trust : Functional and Referral
Reputation-based Process
(Using large number of observations)

May 21, 2012
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Reputation-based Frameworks
• Centralized Trust Authority
– E.g., E-commerce systems, etc.

• Distributed Trust Representation and
Computation (using Bayesian analytics)
– E.g., MANETs, peer-to-peer networks, etc.

May 21, 2012
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Using Large Number of Observations
• Over time (<= Referral + Functional) :
Temporal Reputation-based Process
– Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
– Sensor Networks
• Quantitative information
(Numeric data)

• Over agents (<= Referral + Functional) :
Community Reputation-based Process
– Product Rating Systems
• Quantitative + Qualitative information
(Numeric + text data)
May 21, 2012
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Desiderata for Trustworthiness
Computation Function
• Initialization Problem : How do we get initial value?
• Update Problem : How do we reflect the observed
behavior in the current value dynamically?
• Trusting Trust* Issue: How do we mirror uncertainty
in our estimates as a function of observations?
• Law of Large Numbers: The average of the results obtained from a
large number of trials should be close to the expected value.

• Efficiency Problem : How do we store and update
values efficiently?
*Ken

May 21, 2012
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Mathematical Background
Beta PDF for Reputation

May 21, 2012
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Beta-distribution : Gently
• Consider a (potentially unfair) coin that comes up
HEADS with probability p and TAILS with probability
(1 – p).
• Suppose we perform ( r + s ) coin tosses and the coin
turns up with HEADS r times and with TAILS s times.
• What is the best estimate of the distribution of the
probability p given these observations?
=> Beta-distribution with parameters ( r+1, s+1 )
f(p; r+1, s+1)
May 21, 2012

Trust Networks: T. K. Prasad

58

Beta Probability Density Function(PDF)
x is a probability,
so it ranges from 0-1
If the prior distribution of x is
uniform, then the beta
distribution gives posterior
distribution of x after
observing a-1 occurrences
of event with probability x
and b-1 occurrences of the
complementary event with
probability (1-x).

May 21, 2012
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a = b, so the pdf’s are symmetric w.r.t 0.5.
Note that the graphs get narrower as (a+b) increases.

a= 1
b= 1

a= 5
b= 5

May 21, 2012
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a ≠ b, so the pdf’s are asymmetric w.r.t . 0.5.
Note that the graphs get narrower as (a+b) increases.

a= 5
b= 25

a= 25
b= 5

May 21, 2012
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Beta-distribution - Applicability
• Dynamic trustworthiness
can
be
characterized
using beta probability
distribution function gleaned from total
number of correct (supportive) r = (a-1)
and total number of erroneous
(opposing) s = (b-1) observations so far.
• Overall trustworthiness (reputation) is its
mean: a/a +b
May 21, 2012
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Why Beta-distribution?
• Intuitively satisfactory, Mathematically precise, and
Computationally tractable
• Initialization Problem : Assumes that all probability values
are equally likely.
• Update Problem : Updates (a, b) by incrementing a for
every correct (supportive) observation and b for every
erroneous (opposing) observation.
• Trusting Trust Issue: The graph peaks around the mean, and
the variance diminishes as the number of observations
increase, if the agent is well-behaved.
• Efficiency Problem: Only two numbers stored/updated.
May 21, 2012
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Information Theoretic Interpretation
of Trustworthiness Probability
• Intuitively, probability values of 0 and 1 imply
certainty, while probability value of 0.5 implies
a lot of uncertainty.
• This can be formalized by mapping probability
in [0,1] to trust value in [–1,1], using
information theoretic approach.
Y. L. Sun, et al, 2/2008
May 21, 2012
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Information Theoretic Interpretation
of Trustworthiness Probability
• T(trustee : trustor, action) =
if
0.5 <= p
then
1 – H(p)
/* 0.5 <= p <= 1 */
else
H(p) – 1
/* 0 <= p <= 0.5 */
where
H(p) = – p log2(p) – (1 – p) log2(1 – p)
May 21, 2012
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Plot of T(trustee : trustor, action) vs. p
Trust portion (p in [0.5,1])

May 21, 2012

Distrust portion (p in [0,0.5])
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Linear vs Nonlinear Map
Relative to computing trust as
T(trustee : trustor, action) = ( p – 0.5 ) * 2
to map of trust probability p in [0,1] to a
trust value in [-1,+1], the information
theoretic formulation yields a non-linear
map that amplifies the effect of changes
to trust probability on the trust value at
the extremes.
May 21, 2012
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Direct Trust : Functional
Policy-based Process
(Using Trustworthiness Qualities)

May 21, 2012
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General Approach to Trust Assessment
• Domain dependent qualities for determining
trustworthiness
– Based on Content / Data
– Based on External Cues / Metadata

• Domain independent mapping to trust values
or levels
– Quantification
classification
May 21, 2012
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Example: Wikipedia Articles
• Quality (content-based)
– Appraisal of information provenance
• References to peer-reviewed publication
• Proportion of paragraphs with citation

– Article size
• Credibility (metadata-based)
– Author connectivity
– Edit pattern and development history
•
•
•
•
May 21, 2012

Revision count
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Mean time between edits
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(cont’d)
• Quantification of Trustworthiness
– Based on Dispersion Degree Score
(Extent of deviation from mean)

• Evaluation Metric
– Ranking based on trust level (determined from
trustworthiness scores), and compared to gold
standard classification using Normalized
Discounted Cumulative Gain (NDCG)
• RATINGS: featured, good, standard, cleanup, and stub.
• NDCG: penalizes more heavily errors at the top.
May 21, 2012
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Example: Websites
• Trustworthiness estimated based on criticality
of data exchanged.
•
•
•
•

Email address / Username / password
Phone number / Home address
Date of birth
Social Security Number / Bank Account Number

• Intuition: A piece of data is critical if and only
if it is exchanged with a small number of
highly trusted sites.
May 21, 2012

Trust Networks: T. K. Prasad

74

Indirect Trust : Referral + Functional
Variety of Trust Metrics and Models
(Using Propagation – Chaining and Aggregation over Paths)

May 21, 2012
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Collaborative Filtering
• Collaborative Filtering: Item-rating by a user
predicted on the basis of user’s similarity to
other users.
• Similarity Measures:
• Profile-based
• Item-ratings-based
• Item-category-based
May 21, 2012
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Collaborative Filtering
• Pros:
– Items-agnostic
– Scales well over time with large number of items

• Cons:
– Data Sparsity Problem: Small number of
common items between users.
– Cold Start Users: Small number of items rated
by a user.
– Prone to Copy-Profile Attack: An attacker can
create a targeted-user-like profile to
manipulate recommendations.
May 21, 2012
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Trust-aware Recommender System
• TaRS uses explicit/direct trust between users to
predict implicit/indirect trust between users
through chaining.
• Collaborative Filtering Limitations Overcome:
– Mitigates Data Sparsity: Trust propagation is more
general and improves coverage.
– Bootstraps Cold Start Users: A single trust link from a
new user can enable the user to inherit several
“parental” recommendations.
– Robust w.r.t Copy-Profile Attack: Fake identities are
not trusted by an active user.
Massa-Avesani, 2007
May 21, 2012
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Trust Propagation Frameworks
• Chaining, Aggregation, and Overriding
Golbeck – Hendler, 2006

Massa-Avesani, 2005
Bintzios et al, 2006

• Trust Management

Sun et al, 2006
Thirunarayan et al, 2009
Richardson et al, 2003

• Abstract properties of operators

• Reasoning with trust

Guha et al., 2004

• Matrix-based trust propagation

• The Beta-Reputation System
• Algebra on opinion = (belief, disbelief, uncertainty)
Josang and Ismail, 2002
May 21, 2012
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Trust Propagation Algorithms
• Top-down
• 1: Extract trust DAG (eliminate cycles)
• 2: Predict trust score for a source in a target by
aggregating trust scores in target inherited
from source’s “trusted” parents weighted with
trust value in the corresponding parent.
–Computation is level-by-level
–Alternatively, computation can be based on
paths.
Golbeck – Hendler, 2006

May 21, 2012
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Trust Propagation Algorithms
• Bottom-up
• 1: Extract trust DAG (eliminate cycles)
• 2: Predict trust score for a source in a target by
aggregating trust scores in target inherited
from target’s “trusted” neighbors weighted
with trust value in the corresponding neighbor.
–Computation is level-by-level
–Alternatively, computation can be based on
paths.
Massa-Avesani, 2005
Bintzios et al, 2006

May 21, 2012
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Top-down vs Bottom-up (visualized)
Target
w1

Target

w2

w3

Trust-Network

w1

w2

w3
source

source
May 21, 2012
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Example: Comparative Analysis
Different Interpretation:
q distrusts s (Bintzios et al’s)
vs
q has no information about
the trustworthiness of s (our’s,
Golbeck rounding algorithm)

May 21, 2012
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Example: Well-founded
Cyclic Trust Network

Thirunarayan and Verma, 2007
May 21, 2012
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Example: Using TidalTrust Algorithm

May 21, 2012
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Indirect Trust : Referral + Functional
Variety of Bayesian Trust Models
With Applications to Mobile Ad hoc Networks
Wireless Sensor Networks, etc.

May 21, 2012
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Direct Trust : Functional and Referral
• Trust link: {subject : agent, action}
• For MANETs (resp. cognitive radio)
– Functional => Packet Forwarding (resp. quality of
spectrum / channel)
– Referral => Recommendations
Based on beta-reputation model:
Probability for trust = (S + 1) / (S + F +2)
where S = Number of good actions
F = Number of bad actions
May 21, 2012
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Direct Trust : Functional and Referral
• Direct Trust for Packet Forwarding
• S = Number of packets forwarded
• F = Number of packets dropped
• S + F = Total number of requests for packet forwarding

• Direct Trust for Recommendations
• S = Number of times observed direct trust for packet
forwarding approximates expected indirect trust for
packet forwarding (trust over transit path : r+f)
• F = Number of times observed direct trust for packet
forwarding does not approximate expected indirect
trust for packet forwarding (trust over transit path : r+f)
May 21, 2012
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Indirect Trust : Functional and Referral
• Indirect Trust for Packet Forwarding
– Used when direct trust is not available

»(overriding behavior)
• Chain links for a path from a recommender to the target
– Multiplicative

• Aggregate over multiple
recommenders to the target

(parallel)

paths

from

– Unclear, in general

• Indirect Trust for Recommendations
• Obtained implicitly through computed referral trust
May 21, 2012
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Trust Propagation Rules :
Axioms for Trust Models
Rule 1: Concatenation
propagation does
not increase trust.

|T(A1,C1)| <= min(|R(A1,B1)|, |T(B1,C1)|)

Rule 2: Multipath
propagation does
not reduce trust. 0<=T(A1,C1) <= T(A2,C2) for R1 > 0 and T2 >= 0
0>=T(A1,C1) >= T(A2,C2) for R1 > 0 and T2 < 0
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(cont’d)
Rule 3: Trust based on multiple referrals from a
single source should not be higher than that
from independent sources.

0<=T(A1,C1) <= T(A2,C2) for R1, R2, R3 > 0 and T2 >= 0
0>=T(A1,C1) >= T(A2,C2) for R1, R2, R3 > 0 and T2 < 0
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Trust Propagation Rules :
Implementation
1
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Trust Paths Visualized for Scalability:
Semantics unclear based on Sun et al’s spec
Bottom-up computation
reflects our needs better?
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Trust : Functional and Referral
• Direct Trust for Primitive Actions based on
• S = Number of success actions
• F = Number of failed actions
• S + F = Total number of actions

• Indirect Trust via Recommendations based on
summing direct experiences of recommenders
• Sk = Number of success actions for kth recommender
• Fk = Number of failed actions for kth recommender
• No chaining for referrals
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Cumulative Trust using
Direct Experience and Recommendations

• Cumulative Trust is obtained by using total
number of success actions and failed actions
from direct experience (ns,nu) and from i
(indirect
experiences
through)
recommendations (nsr,nur).
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Contents of [Ganeriwal et al, 2007] Paper
• (a,b)-parameters to compute trust of i in j is
obtained by combining direct observations
(aj,bj) with indirect observations (ajk,bjk) from
k weighted by (ak,bk) using [Josang-Ismail,
2002] chaining/discounting rule.
• Obtains cumulative trust by combining direct trust from
a functional link and indirect trusts using paths
containing one referral link and one functional link.
• However, it does not distinguish functional and referral
trust.
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Trust Propagation Rules :
Beta Reputation System
1
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Trust Propagation Rules :
Beta Reputation System
1

2

Rule 1: Concatenation propagation (reputation
discounting)
r = 2*r1 * r2 / (s1+2)(r2+s2+2)+2*r1
s = 2*r1 * s2 / (s1+2)(r2+s2+2)+2*r1
Rule 2: Multipath propagation (combining
feedback)
r = r1 + r2
s = s1 + s2
Rule *: Temporal Decay (Forgetting)
May 21, 2012

Trust Networks: T. K. Prasad

Josang and Ismail, 2002
108

Contents of [B-Trust, 2006] Paper
• Uses generic K-level discrete trust metric (as
opposed to 2-level metric)
– E.g., (very untrustworthy, untrustworthy, trustworthy, very trustworthy)
– E.g., reminiscent of Amazon recommendation ratings

• Distributed (local), robust, lightweight,
computational trust that takes into account
context, subjectivity, and time
– a la reputation-based approach

• Application: Pervasive computing
May 21, 2012

Trust Networks: T. K. Prasad

109

BUG -> FLAWED LEARNING?
• The approach does not clearly separate the
use of stable background knowledge for
applying Bayes’ rule, from the need to
dynamically learn background knowledge for
gleaning trust from experience.
• As a result, the initial trust values do not
change in response to experience.
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Comparative Analysis
[Menko-T.Sun] : Beta-distribution based
• Direct functional trust and indirect functional
trust (through direct referrals).
– Trivial chaining.
– One fixed context, local and distributed.

• Robustness improved by dropping extreme
recommendations, though recommenders not
distinguished.
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Comparative Analysis
[Ganeriwal et al]: Beta-distribution based
• Functional and Referral trust mixed up.
– Context glossed over, local and distributed.

• Robustness improved by chaining trust links of
length 2, using Josang-Ismail opinion
composition.
– Recommenders distinguished.
– Chaining weighs recommendations by
recommender trust.
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Comparative Analysis
[Y. Sun et al]: Beta-distribution based
• Functional and Referral trust separated.
• One Context, hybrid (dynamically formed trust
network) and distributed.
• Information-theoretic approach

• Axiomatic specification and implementation of
trust propagation (chaining and aggregation)
• Incomplete w.r.t. arbitrary trust networks

• Robustness and Quality improved by analyzing
dynamically formed trust network.
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Comparative Analysis
[B-Trust et al]: Multi-valued trust - Bayesian
• Functional and Referral trust separated.
– Context-based, local and distributed.

• Individualized aggregation, trivial chaining.
• Nice roadmap for theory, specification, and
implementation of trust networks
– Multi-valued Trust evolution : novel but buggy.
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Comparative Analysis
[MLT-Approach]: Multi-level trust using Dirichlet
Distribution
• Functional and Referral trust separated.
– Context-based, local and distributed.

• Individualized aggregation, trivial chaining.
• Based on B-Trust roadmap but MLT evolution
based on Dirichlet distribution: conceptually
satisfactory and computationally efficient
• Example-based analysis for insights
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Security Issues:
Threats and Vulnerabilities
Attacks and Robustness Analysis
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Attacks
• Trust Management is an attractive target for
malicious nodes.
 Bad mouthing attack (Defamation)
 Dishonest recommendations on good nodes (calling them
bad)

 Ballot stuffing attack (Collusion)
 Dishonest recommendations on bad nodes (calling them
good)

 Sybil attack
 Creating Fake Ids

 Newcomer attack
 Registering as new nodes
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Attacks
• Inconsistency in time-domain
 On-Off attack
 Malicious node behaves good and bad alternatively to
avoid detection

 Sleeper attack
 Malicious node acquires high trust by behaving good
and then strikes by behaving bad

 Inconsistency in node-domain
 Conflicting Behavior Attack
 Provide one recommendation to one set of peers and a
conflicting recommendation to a disjoint set of peers
May 21, 2012
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Security : Robustness w.r.t Attacks
 Bad mouthing attack
 Example: Competent nodes downplay competitions.
 Example: Can diminish throughput due to lost capacity.

 Approach:
 Separate functional and referral trust, updating
referral trust to track good recommendations
 Trust composition rules ensure that low or
negative referral trust does not impact decision
 Low trust nodes can be branded as malicious and
avoided. (Not viable if majority collude.)
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Security : Robustness w.r.t Attacks
 Ballot stuffing attack
 Example: Malicious nodes collude to recommend each
other.
 Example: Can cause unexpected loss of throughput.

 Approach:
 Feedback : Cross-check actual functional
performance with expected behavior via referral,
and update (reward/penalize) referral trust (in
parent) accordingly (in addition to updating
functional trust (in target))
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Security : Robustness w.r.t. Attacks
 Sybil attack
 Create Fake Ids to take blame for malicious
behavior (dropping packets)

 Newcomer attack
 Register as new node to erase past history

 Approach
 Requires separate (key-based or security tokenbased) authentication mechanism (with TTP) to
overcome these attacks.
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Security : Robustness w.r.t Attacks
 On-Off attack
 Sleeper attack
 Example: Due to malice or environmental changes

 Approach:
 Use forgetting factor (0<=b<=1):
k good/bad actions at t1
= k * b(t2 – t1) good/bad actions at t2 (> t1)
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Forgetting Factor
k good/bad actions at t1 = k * b(t2 – t1) good/bad actions at t2 (> t1)

• High b value (0.9) enhances memorized time
window, while low b value (0.001) reduces it.
– High b enables malicious nodes (on-off/sleeper
attackers) to use prior good actions to mask
subsequent intentional bad actions.
• Reduces reliability.

– Low b forces legitimate nodes to be avoided due
to short spurts of unintentional bad actions.
• Reduces throughput.
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Adaptive Forgetting Factor
• Intuition: Bad actions are remembered for a
longer duration than good actions.
• Actions performed with high trust forgotten quicker than
actions performed with low trust.
Choose b equal to ( 1 – p )
Choose b = 0.01 when p in [0.5,1] else 0.9
 Example: Similar ideas used in Ushahidi

 Note: Effectively, more good actions are
necessary to compensate for fewer bad actions,
to recover trust.
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Security : Robustness w.r.t. Attacks
 Conflicting Behavior Attack
 Malicious node divide and conquer, by behaving
differently (resp. by providing different
recommendations) to different peers, causing
peers to provide conflicting recommendations to
source about the malicious node (resp. about
some target), reducing source’s referral trust in
some peers.
 Eventually, this causes recommendations of some peers
to be ignored incorrectly.
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Example
• Peer Node Set 1: 1, 2, 3, and 4
• Peer Node Set 2: 5, 6, 7, and 8
• Malicious node 0 behaves well towards nodes in
Set 1 but behaves badly towards nodes in Set 2.
• When node 9 seeks recommendations from
nodes in Set 1 U Set 2 on node 0, node 9 receives
conflicting recommendations on malicious node
0, causing referral trust in nodes in Set 1 or
nodes in Set 2 to be lowered.
=> Eventually throughput lowered
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Security : Robustness w.r.t. Attacks
 Conflicting Behavior Attack
 Issue: Can recommenders get feedback
to reduce trust in malicious node?
Otherwise, referral trust cannot be
relied upon for detecting malicious
nodes.
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Security : Robustness w.r.t. Attacks
 If cumulative referral trust in B is computed using
direct experiences of several recommenders,

then it is possible to weed out extreme
experiences using deviation from the mean trust
value, where S is some chosen threshold.
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Contents of [Ganeriwal et al, 2007] Paper
• Combined trust of i in j is obtained from direct
observations (aj,bj) of j by i and indirect
observations (ajk,bjk) from k to i weighted by
(ak,bk)
using
[Josang-Ismail,
2002]
chaining/weighting/discounting rule.
• This discounting rule makes the local trust
computation resilient to bad mouthing ajk << bjk
and ballot stuffing ajk >> bjk attacks from
unreliable/malicious nodes ak << bk.
• It requires aging to be resilient to sleeper attacks.
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APPROACH/
METRIC
D[3] /
Binary

Trust Type /
Context
Functional / One

Trust Model /
Foundation
Trivial chaining /
Beta-PDF

Robustness to
Attacks
Ballot-stuffing;
Bad-mouthing

G[4] /
Binary

Functional /
Indistinguishable

Josang-Ismail
discounting /
Beta-PDF

S[6] /
Binary

Functional + Referral
/ One

Limited chaining
and aggregation /
Beta-PDF

Ballot-stuffing;
Bad-mouthing;
Sleeper and Onoff
Ballot-stuffing;
Bad-mouthing;
Sleeper and Onoff

Q[28] / Multi-level

Functional + Referral /
Multiple

No /
Bayesian
Ad Hoc

Ballot-stuffing;
Bad-mouthing;
Sleeper and Onoff; Sybil

Ours /
Multi-level

Functional + Referral /
Multiple

No /
Dirichlet-PDF

Ballot-stuffing;
Bad-mouthing;
Sleeper and Onoff; Conflicting
behavior
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Research Challenges
(What-Why-How of trust?)
HARD PROBLEMS
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Generic Directions
• Finding online substitutes for traditional cues
to derive measures of trust.
• Creating efficient and secure systems for
managing and deriving trust, in order to
support decision making.
Josang et al, 2007
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Robustness Issue
You can fool some
people all of the time,
of the people some
time, but you cannot
of the people all of the

of the
and all
of the
fool all
time.

Abraham Lincoln,
16th president of US (1809 - 1865)
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Trust : Social Networks vs
Machine Networks
• In social networks such as Facebook, trust is
often subjective, while in machine networks
and social networks such as Twitter, trust can
be given an objective basis and approximated
by trustworthiness.
• Reputation is the perception that an agent
creates through past actions about its
intentions and norms.
– Reputation can be a basis for trust.
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Sensor Networks
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Our Research
Abstract trustworthiness of sensors and
observations to perceptions to obtain actionable
situation awareness!
Web

T

observe

perceive

T

T

“real-world”
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Trust

Strengthened Trust
May 21, 2012

Trust Networks: T. K. Prasad

139

Concrete Application
• Applied Beta-pdf to Mesowest Weather Data
– Used quality flags (OK, CAUTION, SUSPECT)
associated with observations from a sensor
station over time to derive reputation of a sensor
and trustworthiness of a perceptual theory that
explains the observation.
– Perception cycle used data from ~800 stations,
collected for a blizzard during 4/1-6/03.
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Concrete Application
• Perception Cycle
– http://harp.cs.wright.edu/perception/

• Trusted Perception Cycle
– http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lTxzghCjGgU

May 21, 2012

Trust Networks: T. K. Prasad

141

Mean of beta pdf vs. Time (for stnID = SBE)
1.2

1

0.8

Mean Beta
0.6
Value

0.4

0.2

0
3/31/2003 0:00

4/1/2003 0:00

4/2/2003 0:00

4/3/2003 0:00

4/4/2003 0:00

4/5/2003 0:00

4/6/2003 0:00

4/7/2003 0:00

Time
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Research Issues
• Outlier Detection
– Homogeneous Networks
• Statistical Techniques

– Heterogeneous Networks (sensor + social)
• Domain Models

• Distinguishing between abnormal phenomenon
(observation), malfunction (of a sensor), and
compromised behavior (of a sensor)
– Abnormal situations
– Faulty behaviors
– Malicious attacks
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Social Networks
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Our Research
• Study semantic issues relevant to trust
• Proposed model of trust/trust metrics to
formalize indirect trust
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Quote
• Guha et al:
While continuous-valued trusts are
mathematically clean, from the standpoint
of usability, most real-world systems will
in fact use discrete values at which one
user can rate another.
• E.g., Epinions, Ebay, Amazon, Facebook, etc all
use small sets for (dis)trust/rating values.
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Our Approach




Trust formalized in terms of partial orders
(with emphasis on relative magnitude)
Local but realistic semantics
Distinguishes functional and referral trust
 Distinguishes direct and inferred trust
 Direct trust overrides conflicting inferred trust
 Represents ambiguity explicitly


Thirunarayan et al , 2009
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Formalizing the Framework
• Given a trust network (Nodes AN, Edges RL U
PFL U NFL with Trust Scopes TSF, Local
Orderings ⪯ANxAN), specify when a source can
trust, distrust, or be ambiguous about a
target, reflecting local semantics of:
• Functional and referral trust links
• Direct and inferred trust
• Locality
May 21, 2012

Trust Networks: T. K. Prasad

149

(In recommendations)
(For capacity to act)
(For lack of
capacity to act)
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Similarly for Evidence in support of Negative Functional Trust.
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Benefits of Formal Analysis
• Enables
detecting
and
unintended consequences.

avoiding

– An earlier formalization gave priority to “certain“
conclusion from less trustworthy source over
“ambiguous“ conclusion from more trustworthy
source.

The whole problem with the world is
that fools and fanatics are always so
certain of themselves, but wiser people
so full of doubts. — Betrand Russell
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Practical Issues
• Refinement of numeric ratings using
reviews in product rating networks
– Relevance : Separate ratings of vendor or about
extraneous features from ratings of product
• E.g., Issues about Amazon’s policies
• E.g., Publishing under multiple titles (Paul Davies’ “The Goldilock’s
Enigma” vs. “Cosmic Jackpot”)

– Polarity/Degree of support: Check consistency
between rating and review using sentiment
analysis; amplify hidden sentiments
• E.g., rate a phone as 1-star because it is the best 
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Research Issues
• Determination of trust / influence from
social networks
– Text analytics on communication
– Analysis of network topology
• E.g., follower relationship, friend relationship, etc.

• Determination of untrustworthy and
anti-social elements in social networks
• HOLY GRAIL: Direct Semantics in favor of
Indirect Translations
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Research Issues
• Improving Security : Robustness to Attack
– How to exploit different trust processes to detect
and recover from attacks?
• Bad mouthing attack
• Ballot stuffing attack
• Sleeper attack
– Temporal trust discounting proportional to trust value
– Using policy-based process to ward-off attack using
reputation-based process

• Sybil attack
• Newcomer attack
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Research Issues
• Intelligent integration of mobile sensor and
social data for situational awareness
– To exploit complementary and corroborative
evidence provided by them
– To obtain qualitative and quantitative context
– To improve robustness and completeness
– To incorporate socio-cultural, linguistic and
behavioral knowledge as part of ontologies to
improve semantic processing and analysis of data
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Complementary and Corroborative
Information
Sensors observe
slow moving
traffic

Complementary
information
from social
networks
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Corroborative Evidence
Evidence for
reported
observations
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Interpersonal and Ecommerce
Networks
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Research Issues
• Linguistic clues that betray
trustworthiness
• Experiments for gauging interpersonal
trust in real world situations
– *Techniques and tools to detect and amplify
useful signals in Self to more accurately predict
trust and trustworthiness in Others
*IARPA-TRUST program
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Research Issues
• Other clues for gleaning trustworthiness
– Face (in photo) can effect perceived
trustworthiness and decision making
–Trust-inducing features of e-commerce
sites can impact buyers
– Personal traits: religious beliefs, age,
gullibility, benevolence, etc
– Nature of dyadic relationship
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Research Issues
• Study of cross-cultural differences in
trustworthiness qualities and trust thresholds
to better understand
– Influence
• What aspects improve influence?
– Manipulation
• What aspects flag manipulation?
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Collaborative Systems :
Grid and P2P Computing
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Research Issues
• Trust-aware resource management and
scheduling
– Clients specify resource
preferences/requirements/constraints

• Trust models for P2P systems
– To detect bad domains
– To detect bogus recommendations and attacks
Azzedin and Maheshwaran, 2002-2003
Azzedin and Ridha, 2010
Bessis et al, 2011
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Bayesian Trust Management Framework :
Multi-level Trust Metric
Illustrating a General Approach
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Quercia et al 2006
Josang and Haller 2007
Thirunarayan et al 2012
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Outline
• Motivation : Multi-level trust management
• Mathematical Foundation: Dirichlet
Distribution
• Implementation and Behavior Details:
– Local Trust Data Structures
– Trust Formation
– Bayesian Trust Evolution

• Analysis of Robustness to Attacks: Security
• Evaluation: Example trace vs. experiment
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Motivation
• Uses K-level discrete trust metric
– E.g., Amazon’s 5-star trust metric can be
interpreted as signifying (very untrustworthy,
untrustworthy, neutral, trustworthy, very
trustworthy) or (very dissatisfied, dissatisfied,
neutral, satisfied, very satisfied).
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Approach
• Multi-level trust management approach
formalizes
a
distributed,
robust,
lightweight, computational trust that
takes into account context, subjectivity,
and time.
• Applies
Dirichlet
distribution,
a
generalization of Beta-distribution.
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Dirichlet Distribution
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K-level Trust Metric
• K-level trust probability vector:
x = (x1, . . ., xK)
where (x1 + . . . + xK = 1).
• Example: If a 5-star rating system has 50 people
giving 5-stars, 20 people giving 4-stars, 5 people
giving 3-stars, 5 people giving 2-stars, and 20 people
giving 1-star, then the 5-level trust metric probability
vector is (0.5,0.2,0.05,0.05,0.2).
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Trust and Experience
• Experience is a realization of latent trust and
helps predicting trust.
• Probability of an experience-level sequence,
with a1 - 1 counts of level 1 experience, …, aK - 1
counts of level K experience is:
* ( (a1 +…+ aK – K) ! / (a1-1 ! *…* aK-1 !) )
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Dirichlet Distribution
• The Dirichlet distribution is the probability
density function for x = (x1, . . ., xK) given
(a1,…,aK):
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Why use Dirichlet Distribution?
• If the prior distribution of x is uniform, then
the Dirichlet family of distribution shown
below gives posterior distribution of x after
ai-1 occurrences of level i experience with
probability xi, for each i in [1, K]:
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Why use Dirichlet Distribution?
• Dirichlet distribution is a conjugate prior for
multinomial distribution.
• Consequence:
– Estimated distribution updated for a new experience
at level i, by just incrementing ai parameter.
– In contrast: if prior distribution is different from
Dirichlet, then it is conceptually hard to comprehend
and computationally inefficient to compute posterior
distribution, in general.
– Icing on the cake: Uniform distribution (signifying
ignorance) is Dirichlet!
May 21, 2012

Trust Networks: T. K. Prasad

179

Dirichlet distribution is a conjugate prior
for multinomial distribution.
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Why use Dirichlet Distribution?
• Convenient Abstraction
–Abstraction of K-level Dirichlet
distribution by combining different
levels still yields Dirichlet distribution
with the corresponding parameters
merged.
• Conceptually
and
pleasing property
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Visualizing Dirichlet Distribution (K=3):
Color Density plot on 2D simplex

May 21, 2012

Trust Networks: T. K. Prasad

182

Dynamic Trustworthiness
• Best estimate of trust for Dir(a1,...,aK) (gleaned
from (ai-1) experiences at level i, for all i in [1,K])
is the mean vector (a1/a0,…,aK/a0), and the
associated confidence is the variance vector.
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Implementation and Behavior Details
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Local Data Structures
• To store relevant information to compute
direct (functional) and indirect (referral) trust.
• Each node maintains locally, for each peer and
each context, four vectors of length K.
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Local Data Structures
•

Direct Trust Vector: Peers X Contexts X Peers -> Probability-Vector-K

• dtv(px,c,py) = (d1,d2,…,dK)
•

Direct Experience Matrix: Peers X Contexts X Peers -> Count-Vector-K

• dem(px,c,py) = (ec1,…,ecK)
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Local Data Structures
•

Recommended Trust Vector: Peers X Contexts X Peers -> ProbabilityVector-K

• rtv(px,c,py) = (r1,r2,…,rK)
•

Sent Recommendation Matrix: Peers X Contexts X Peers -> Count-Vector-K

• srm(px,c,py) = (sr1,…,srK)

May 21, 2012

Trust Networks: T. K. Prasad

187

Local Data Structures
• Initialization: To reflect complete
ignorance via uniform distribution, we
set the probability vectors dtv and rtv to
(1/K,…,1/K), and the elements of the
count vector dem and srm to (0,…,0).
• These are Dirichlet distributed in the
limiting case where ai’s are 1.
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Trust Formation
• Overall trust vector is weighted combination
of direct trust vector and recommended trust
vector.
• Weights determined using
– Objective confidence values using variance
(deviation from the mean)
– Subjective relative preference for direct
experience over recommendations
• Dependence on recommended trust yet to be explored
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Trust Decision
• Assuming that trust-level scale is linear, the
trust distribution vector (d1,d2,…,dK) can be
mapped to the closed interval [0,1], or to
consolidated trust level, in order to act.
• Trust threshold should be determined based
on the context and risk tolerance / disposition
/ propensity to trust.
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Trust Evolution
• Direct (recommended) trust vectors are updated
for a new experience (recommendation).
• Key Idea: Dirichlet distribution is the conjugate
prior of the multinomial distribution. So it is
adequate to maintain counts of direct experience
and sent recommendations, to best estimate
direct trust and recommended trust vectors
respectively.
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Trust Evolution
• Simple Scheme (Direct Trust)
For a new experience at level i,
dem(px,x,py) = (ec1,…,ecK) becomes
demnew(px,x,py) = (ec1,…, eci+1,…,ecK)
and dtv(px,c,py) becomes
dtvnew(px,c,py) = (d1,d2,…,dK)
where di = eci+1 / (ec1 + … + eck+1) and
dj = ecj / (ec1 + … + eck+1)
for each j in [1,K] and j =/= i.
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Trust Evolution
• Robust Scheme
To incorporate differential aging of experience
counts as a function of their level (and to
incorporate “long term memory for low-level
experience and short term memory for highlevel experience”),
we use a decay vector
(l1,…,lK), where 1 >= l1 >= … >= lK > 0, that
modifies update rule as:
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Trust Evolution
• Robust Scheme (Direct Trust)
For a new experience at level i,
dem(px,x,py) = (ec1,…,ecK) becomes
demnew(px,x,py) = (ec1,…, eci + 1,…,ecK).
For every clock tick (with context-based delay),
dem(px,x,py) = (ec1,…,ecK) becomes
demnew(px,x,py) = (l1*ec1,…, lK*ecK)
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Trust Evolution
• Robust Scheme (Direct Trust)
For every clock unit and new experience,
dtv(px,c,py) becomes
dtvnew(px,c,py) = (d1,d2,…,dK)
where di = eci / (ec1 + … + eck)
for each i in [1,K].

• Subtlety: Experience counts should saturate at
1 rather than diminish to 0 with time. (See code)
May 21, 2012

Trust Networks: T. K. Prasad

195

Trust Evolution Illustrated
Experience Sequence

Final Trust Distribution
(Simple Scheme)

[1,1,1]

(0.57,0.14,0.14,0.14)

[1,4,1,4]

(0.375,0.125,0.125,0.375)

[1,1,4,4,4,4,1,1]

(0.42,0.08,0.08,0.42)

[1,1,4,4,4,4,1,1,1]

(0.53,0.07,0.07,0.33)

[2,3,2,3]

(0.125,0.375,0.375,0.125)
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Final Trust Distribution
(Robust Scheme)

(0.55,0.15,0.15,0.15)
(0.42,0.14,0.14,0.29)
(0.5,0.1,0.1,0.3)
(0.64,0.1,0.1,0.17)
(0.16,0.4,0.3,0.14)
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Trust Evolution Illustrated
Trust Distribution Trace
(Simple Scheme)

Trust Distribution Trace
(Robust Scheme)

Beta-pdf
(cf. n =2)

(0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25)

(0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25)

0.5

1

(0.4,0.2,0.2,0.2)

(0.4,0.2,0.2,0.2)

0.33

1

(0.5,0.17,0.17,0.17)

(0.53,0.165,0.155,0.15)

0.25

1

(0.57,0.14,0.14,0.14)

(0.55,0.15,0.15,0.15)

0.2

n

(0.5,0.125,0.125,0.25)

(0.5,0.13,0.12,0.25)

0.33

n

(0.44,0.11,0.11,0.33)

(0.46,0.135,0.135,0.27)

0.43

n

(0.4,0.1,0.1,0.4)

(0.42,0.12,0.11,0.35)

0.5

n

(0.36,0.1,0.1,0.45)

(0.37,0.12,0.12,0.38)

0.55

1

(0.42,0.08,0.08,0.41)

(0.47,0.11,0.11,0.31)

0.5

1

(0.46,0.08,0.08,0.38)

(0.53,0.11,0.11,0.24)

0.45

1

(0.5,0.07,0.07,0.35)

(0.6,0.1,0.1,0.2)

0.41

1

(0.53,0.07,0.07,0.33)

(0.65,0.1,0.1,0.14)

0.38

n

(0.5,0.0625,0.0625,0.375)

(0.6,0.1,0.1,0.2)

0.43

1

(0.53,0.06,0.06,0.35)

(0.64,0.1,0.1,0.17)

0.4

Experience
Sequence Value
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Analysis and Robustness Issues
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Salient Properties
• Symmetry
– Simple
Scheme
is
symmetric
w.r.t.
trust/experience levels while Robust Scheme is
somewhat asymmetric because of non-uniform
decay.
– Experience levels are “preserved” in that
extreme/controvertial
behavior
(credulous
interpretation) is treated differently from
ignorance (skeptical interpretation).
May 21, 2012

Trust Networks: T. K. Prasad

201

Salient Properties
• Effect of Order of Experience
– Simple Scheme is sensitive to the counts of
various experience levels, but not to the order of
experience.
– Robust Scheme is sensitive to the order of
experience.

May 21, 2012

Trust Networks: T. K. Prasad

202

Salient Properties
• Differential Aging of experience levels

• It exhibits limited and selective
memory.
–It retains low-level experiences
much longer than high-level
experiences.
»Parameters: Decay rate and
saturation
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Related Work on Multi-level Trust
with Applications
The described approach is similar to Dirichlet Reputation
System [Josang-Haller, 2007].
Applications:
• Browser toolbar for clients to see the user ratings and
for users to provide ratings (critical surfer model)
[Josang-Haller, 2007]
• Evaluating partners in Collaborative Environments
[Yang and Cemerlic, 2009]
• Formalizing Multi-Dimensional Contracts [Reece, et al,
2007]
• In Collaborative Intrusion Detection System [Fung et al,
2011 ]
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Conclusion
• Provided simple examples of trust (Why?)
• Explained salient features of trust (What?)
• Showed examples of gleaning trustworthiness
(How?)
• Touched upon research challenges in the
context of
•
•
•
•
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Holy Grail
for Automatic Trust Computation

Develop
expressive
trust
networks that can be assigned
objective semantics.
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Thank You!
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